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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the effect of political connection and effectiveness of 
audit committee on audit fee. This study uses the sample of


companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2015-2017. 
They were take using a purposive sampling method. The total number of 
companies is 444 companies. The data were analyzed using SPSS 20 and 
the hypothesis testing was
	

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level of 5%. The F test indicates that the research model is stable and 
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variables that can affect the model by 61.6%. The results of this study show 
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auditor.
ABSTRAK

 penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis pengaruh koneksi 
politik  dan efektivitas komite audit terhadap biaya audit. Penelitian ini 
menggunakan sampel perusahaan non-keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa 
Efek Indonesia (BEI) pada 2015-2017. Teknik pengambilan sampel yang 
digunakan adalah metode purposive sampling. Jumlah total perusahaan yang 
digunakan sebagai sampel penelitian adalah 444 perusahaan, menggunakan 
alat SPSS 20. =
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bahwa ada variabel lain yang dapatmempengaruhi model sebesar 61,6%. 
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komite audit menginginkan kualitas audit yang lebih tinggi dari auditor.
1. INTRODUCTION
The capital market has developed very rapidly 
along with the intense business competition in 
Indonesia. According to the Financial Services 
Authority of the Republic of Indonesia (OJK), 
the capital market in Indonesia has become one 
of the investment destinations for foreign and 
domestic investors. OJK Regulation number 
29/ POJK/ 2016 states that companies whose 
shares are traded on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) should report their audited 
 	
	   	 
statements issued by the companies are a 
source of information for decision making for 
investors, creditors, debtors, management, and 
the government (Arnold et al., 2012). However, 
  	
	  	 
information and accountability to shareholders 
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process conducted by an external auditor 
(Lestari 2015).
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between principals and agents (Jensen and 
	 !"#$% & 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
of interest, principals should monitor the 
procedures to oversee the performance of 
agents by employing external auditors. 
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However, monitoring procedures can increase 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency costs are costs incurred by the principal 
to carry out audit procedures on the company 
(Francis and Wilson, 1988).
External auditors, in carrying out audit 
procedures, must measure the risk of the 
company or client to be audited (Ghosh and 
Tang, 2015). Risk assessment is an analysis 
conducted by the auditor about relevant 
risks associated with the preparation of the 

*+-  	
	 :;	 	 
2014). The higher the audit risk assessed by the 
auditor, the higher the audit effort needed to 
produce an appropriate audit opinion (Bedard 
and Johnstone, 2004). Therefore, audit risk can 
determine how much the cost to be paid by the 
company which is measured by the amount of 
effort made by the auditor in conducting audit 
procedures. Inherent risk is one of the risks 
assessed by the auditor before conducting the 
audit process (Arens et al., 2014).
Companies that have political connections 
are associated with high inherent risk (Gul, 
2006). Inherent risk is the risk of material 
misstatement assertions (Arens et al., 2014). In 
addition to being associated with inherent risk, 
companies that have political connections are 
also associated with a low level of transparency 
	
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(Chaney et al., 2011; Srinidh et al., 2011; Walker 
and Reid, 2002; Yu and Yu, 2011). The higher the 
risk, the higher the efforts taken by the auditor 
in examining politically connected companies. 
Auditors are expected to provide appropriate 
*   	
	 > 	
audit fees from connected companies as a 
return (Ariningrum and Diyanty, 2017; Gul, 
2006; Khan et al., 2016; Tee, 2018; Wahab et al., 
2011; Wahab et al. ., 2009).
In addition to political connections within 
the company, there are other factors that 
can also affect audit fee, such as corporate 
governance. Corporate governance can be said 
to be good if it meetsthe standards applied to the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). Corporate governance 
is related to the supervisory function carried out 
by the board of commissioners by establishing 
committees under them, one of which is the 
Audit Committee.
Results of research conducted by Ghanem 
et al, (2016) and Collier and Gregory (2006) 
show that the effectiveness of audit committees 
has a positive effect on audit fees because the 
existence of an effective audit committee in 
a company is considered to provide a more 
objective supervision system. An effective 
monitoring system will generate demand 
 @		  <+   > 	
implications for greater audit fees (Hay et al, 
2006).
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 Q		 U@
Accountants (IAPI) has regulated the audit 
policy based on regulation number 2 of 2016 
stating that the amount of member fees may 
vary depending on the risk of the assignment, 
the complexity of the services provided, 
	 		  	*		 	<	 	 U@
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and other professional considerations. IAPI 
reported in 2016 that the application of 
regulatory mechanisms was not optimal to 
	 		 >		  
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accountants who did not disclose how they 
determined the amount of audit fees to be 
received. Considering that this regulation has 
not been implemented effectively in Indonesia, 
the determining factor of audit fees in Indonesia 
is still an interesting topic to study. Therefore, 
the purpose of this study is to provide empirical 
evidence of factors that affect audit fees, such 
as the existence of political connection in a 
company and the effectiveness of the Audit 
Committee.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HY-
POTHESIS 
According to Li et al. (2008), the existence of 
political connection within a company can 
			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policies that favor the company and ease in 
obtaining government projects. In order to 
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the company has (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003). The company should provide 
resources in the form of donation to related 
parties in order to create policies. This should 
@		 	 
*+  *	  	
with the exploitation and manipulation of 
company resources, because the donation itself 
is not always through the approval of minority 
shareholders, thus triggering agency problems 
(Ramsay et al., 2001). Therefore, the existence 
of political connections in companies is often 
associated with a low level of transparency in 
	
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Srinidh et al., 2011; Walker and Reid , 2002; Yu 
and Yu, 2011).
Companies that have a higher risk are 
more likely to have material misstatements 
 	  	
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higher the auditor’s assessment of risks in the 
company including inherent risk, the higher 
	  	 	<	 @+ 	  
audit the company. In addition, greater efforts 
cause auditors to feel that they need to charge 
large amounts of audit fees to the company 
(Gul, 2006). Therefore, politically connected 
companies are believed to pay greater audit 
fees than companies that are not politically 
connected (Ariningrum and Diyanty, 2017; 
Gul, 2006; Khan et al., 2016; Tee, 2018; Wahab 
et al., 2011; Wahab et al., 2009).
H1: Political connection within the company has a 
positive effect on audit fees
Indonesia implements a two-tier system 
in corporate governance. The highest organ of 
the company that has a supervisory function 
is the board of commissioners.  To help carry 
out the supervisory function, the board of 
commissioners forms an audit committee. With 
regard to audit fees, there are two arguments 
that illustrate the effect of the effectiveness of 
the audit committee on audit fees.
	  
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seen through the auditor’s perspective. An 
effective audit committee can improve the 
<+  *	 		 	 
believes that inherent risk can be lower if the 
audit committee in the company is effective in 
carrying out its duties. This ultimately reduces 
the audit fees charged to the company (Wahab 
et al, 2011). The second argument is on the 
demand. As described by Hey et al. (2006), 
audit fees paid by companies are determined 
by companies as users. The effectiveness of the 
supervisory function is carried out by the Board 
of Commissioners and assisted by the Audit 
Q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audit procedures. This can have implication 
for the high amount of audit fees charged by 
the auditor.
H2: The effectiveness of the audit committee has a 
positive effect on audit fees.
3. RESEARCH METHOD
The population in this study is all companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
:&_`% *	 VZ!q{VZ!# 		*  
companies. This research began in 2015 
to coincide with the Indonesia President 
Jokowi’s administration. The type of data 
used in this study was secondary data taken 
from information presented in the Annual 
Report. A total of 444 companies were selected 
as research samples based on a purposive 

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on Table 1.
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The dependent variable of the study is audit 
		>			
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
	
*+
				
of an external auditor who has conducted 
   	  	
	  	
company concerned. Audit fee is measured by 
the natural logarithm of audit fees contained in 
		
	
The independent variables in this study 
are political connection and effectiveness of the 


		U			
as a condition in which one of the company’s 
leaders, such as the board of directors, the board 
of commissioners, or the majority shareholder 
(having a minimum share of 10%) is a member 
of the legislature, ministers, political party 
leaders or people related to the government. 
Political connection (POL) in this study is 
measured by a dummy variable, by giving a 
value of 1 for companies that have political 
connection and a value of 0 for companies that 
do not have political connection.

	!"#
No Sample Criteria 2015 2016 2017
1 Companies listed on the IDX 510 525 510
2 Financial Industry Company (80) (82) (87)
3 		
	@			 (95) (64) (46)
4 Companies that do not disclose audit fees (232) (230) (255)
Total 103 149 192
Total Observation 444
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The second independent variable is the 
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protect the interests of shareholders to ensure 
 	  	* 	 
and risk management are reliable, through 
efforts to carry out diligent supervision. 
The effectiveness of the audit committee is 
measured by the composite index (EFFAC5) 

	 > 	 	 	 	
combined characteristics are: Independent 
Audit Committee (IAC), Audit Committee 
Expertise (ACEXP), Audit Committee Diligence 
(ACD), Size of Audit Committee (SAC) and 
Audit Committee Chair with Accounting 
Expertise (ACCHX). A score system is used 
where the dichotomous score of “1” or “0” 
is for each characteristic of an effective audit 
committee (Ali et al., 2018). After obtaining the 
value of the effectiveness score, the researcher 
ranked it by the score of the effectiveness of the 
audit committee in the company divided by 
the value of perfect score.
The control variables in this study are 
*@
		:};%
 
*+ ~	 U@  
 
measured by dummy variable. Code 1 is given 
to companies that use big 4 public accounting 
services and code 0 is given to companies that 
use non big 4 public accounting services. ROA 
is measured using operating income after 
tax divided by total assets. Company size is 
measured using the natural logarithm of total 
assets.
	 + 	<	 	 	
descriptive statistical analysis, classical 
assumption test, and hypothesis test (Ghozali, 
2011). Descriptive statistical analysis contains 
information about the characteristics of research 
data in the form of minimum values, maximum 
values, mean values, and standard deviations. 
Hypothesis test is done using multiple linear 
regression analysis. The following is regression 
	<
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Note:
AudFee = Audit Fee issued by a public-listed 
entity
0 = Constant
POL =Political connection within the 
company
EFFAC =Effectiveness of audit committee
BIG4 =Auditor big 4. Using dummy, 
1 means audited by Big 4, and 0 
means audited by other than Big 4
ROA =Return of asset
SIZE =Company Size
it 		
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
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
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Based on the descriptive statistics on Table 2, it 
indicates that the dependent variable of audit 
fee has an average value of IDR 775 million, 
which means that the average company in 
Indonesia in 2015 to 2017 was paid the total 
audit fee of IDR 775 million to the auditor. 
Based on the difference between the maximum 
and minimum values, the range on this variable 
 <	    	 
*	 
companies in this study represent the nominal 
amount of audit fees from small to large. In 
addition, there are 307 companies that have 
political connections, or approximately 69.1% 
of the total sample. The results of this study 
also support the results of research conducted 
by Faccio. (2006) that there are more than 28% 
of companies in Indonesia that have political 
connection.
The independent variable of the 
effectiveness of the Audit Committee is 

		 @+ 	 	  	 
the researchconducted by Ali et al. (2018).The 
score of the effectiveness of audit committee 
for each company is divided by perfect score. 
The average value obtained is 0.8059. The 
result shows that the average sample company 
has a good score in the effectiveness of audit 
committee. The average value in the study 
conducted by Ali et al. (2018) is 4, with the 
ratio of 0.8 obtained from a score of 4 on the 
	 	  	 				  	
audit committee.
	%	  ;%
 
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The hypotheses in this study were tested using 
multiple linear regression analysis. Before 
doing the multiple linear regression analysis, 
the researchers conduct classical assumption 
test consisting of data normality test, 
heteroscedasticity test, and the multicolinearity 
test. The classical assumption test was 
	    >		 	 		
data are normally distributed, and free from 
heterokedasticity and multicolinearity. This 
research model is feasible to do multiple linear 
regression analysis because it has passed the 
classical assumption test.
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In Table 3, it shows that the value of 
adjusted R2 is 0.384, which means that variations 
in the variables of political connection and the 
effectiveness of the audit committee are able to 
explain the dependent variable of audit fees by 
>			
$!$		
by other factors outside the research model 
that are not selected as dependent variables. 
	
	 	  	 >  	
value of 0.000, indicating that the independent 
@	   @	 +
affect the dependent variable.
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The results of research conducted using this 
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which states that political connection has a 
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hypothesis (H1) is accepted. It can be concluded 
that the existence of political connection in a 
company can increase the inherent risk of a 
company (Gul, 2006). Politically connected 
companies can help government-related affairs 
(Faccio, 2006), and the connected companies 
@@+*	@			
*	
Companies that have political connections 
will cover the process of political contributions 
which will result in low transparency in the 
 	
	 > *	+ 
	  *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	 
statements (Chaney et al., 2011; Srinidh et 
al., 2011; Walker and Reid, 2002; Yu and Yu, 
2011). The higher the risk, the higher the efforts 
taken by the auditor in examining politically 
connected companies. Auditors are expected 
 *	 ***	 *  
statements, and as a return they will get 
higher audit fees from connected companies 
(Ariningrum and Diyanty, 2017; Gul, 2006; 
Khan et al., 2016; Tee, 2018; Wahab et al., 2011; 
Wahab et al. ., 2009).
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=
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N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Fee 444 17.66 28.4696 20.4696 1.15451
Committee 444 .40 1.00 .8059 .14178
RoA 444 -.46 1.85 .0475 .13989
Asset 444 19.30 31.88 28.7188 1.74163
Valid N (list-
wise)
444
Dummy Variable
Variable %Score1 %Score0 total%
Political Connection (307) 69,1% (137) 30.9% (444) 100%
Effectiveness of Audit Committee (246) 35,4% (198) 44,6% (444) 100%
Source: Data Procces
>
"
	
		
Variables Q		 t-statistic Sig
Constant 13.869 17.355 .000
Political Connection .324 .130 .001
Effectiveness of Audit Committee -.597 -1.965 .050
Public Accounting Firm .776 8.321 .000
RoA .700 2.262 .024
Asset .226 8.336 .000
F-test .000
Adjusted R2 .384
N 444
Source: Data Procces
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The result of this study is also in line with 
the perspective of the Audit Pricing Theory 
which states that the auditor determines the 
audit fees to be charged because they must 
consider the risks that the company has. This 
@					
@		
	
by auditors to carry out audit procedures. 
Politically connected companies have a high 
inherent risk (Gul, 2006). It is also in line with 
the theory and empirical results that politically 
connected companies pay higher audit fees 
than unconnected companies.
!   ! 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The results of this study show that the 
effectiveness of the audit committee has 
a positive effect on audit fee, with the 
	 		  q :ZZqZ ZZq  
reason, the second hypothesis (H2) in this 
study is accepted. It can be explained that, 
in practice, audit fees are seen not only from 
	 - *	*		    		
provider, but also from the client’s  perspective 
that plays a role in determining the audit fees 
 @	 * :	+ 	  VZZ$% Q	 	<	
determine the audit fees paid because the client 
>	@+	<+
auditor, thus causing the audit fees charged to 
be higher.
Companies that have effective audit 
committees will encourage the companies to 
	 @		  <+ 	 
*	 
this to maintain their reputation and protect 
themselves from legal responsibilities that 
might occur in the future due to the low level 
of supervision that the companiesdo (Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal, & Riley, 2002). Demand for 
@		<+>			
will make the company pay a higher audit.
The results of this study support the 
argument ofdemand-side theory which states 
that the higher the level of the effectiveness of 
supervision conducted by the Audit Committee 
to assist the Board of Commissioners in 
overseeing management, the higher the 
	
@		<+		

<+>		
audit fees charged by auditors (Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal, & Riley, 2002).
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGE-
STION, AND LIMITATIONS
This study aims to analyze the effect of 
political connections and the effectiveness of 
the auditcommittee on audit fees. Based on the 
 +*	 	  *	 			
that the existence of political connection in 
	 
*+ + 	  		
Politically connected companies are considered 
to have a higher risk than other companies 
that do not have political connections. 
Q	<	+>			
	 	<	 	  	 
audit fees charged (Ariningrum and Diyanty, 
2017; Gul, 2006; Khan et al., 2016; Tee, 2018; 
Wahab et al., 2011; Wahab et al., 2009). Based 
on the second hypothesis testing, it isfound 
that the effectiveness of the audit committee 
   		   		 
result supports the argument of demand- side 
theorywhich states that an effective audit 
committee will conduct oversight. The audit 
committee will ask the auditor to conduct good 
<+  > > 	 
*
for the high audit fees charged (Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal, & Riley, 2002).
The limitations in this research include: 1) 
there is only a small number of companies that 
disclose audit fees in their annual reports; 2) 
in Indonesia, there are still no reliable sources 
that show someone’s poliitical relationship, 
so the researchers only use online media as 

    
		- *
relationship. 
This study recommends that, for further 
study, the researchers should add variables 
that have an effec on audit fees. In addition, this 
+ 	  	 		
more accurate sources for one’s relationship 
with politics.
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